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THE EFFECT OF THEoRIEs OF OWNERSIP UPON THE REMEDIES OF
AN OIL AND GAS LESSEE
As Cardozo once said: 1
The law of our day faces a twofold need. The first is the need of
some restatement that will bring certainty and order out of the wilder-
ness of precedent. This is the task of legal science. The second is the need
of a. philosophy that will mediate between the conflicting claims of
stability and progress, and supply a principle of growth.
It is with no little temerity that the writers here attempt to satisfy,
in a very limited field of course, the first need underscored by the late
Justice.
In the law of oil and gas, a constant source of confusion has been
the flood of "interests" said to be created by an oil and gas lease.
The nature of this interest created is in a large measure determined
by the theory of ownership smiled upon in any one state. And in a
practical sense, legal remedies are often molded by the theory of
ownership and, too, by the nature of the interest created in an oil
and gas lease.
The following will be a discussion, in a selection of states, of some
of the remedies available to an oil and gas lessee, as influenced by the
local theory of ownership and by the nature of the lessee's interest.
I.
Texas
Texas, which boasts one of the largest producing areas in the
world, upholds the theory of absolute ownership of oil and gas in
place,2 limited, of course, by the rule of capture a and, to some extent,
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1 CARozo, THE GROwT OF =E LAW 1 (1924).
2 Marrs v. Railroad Commission, 142 Tex. 293, 177 S.W. (2d) 941, 948
(1944); Elder v. Miller, 116 S.W. (2d) 1171, 1173 (Tex. Civ. App. 1938);
Brown v. Humble Oil & Refining Co., 126 Tex. 296, 83 S.W. (2d) 935, 940
(1935).
3 Railroad Commission v. Humble Oil & Refining Co., 193 S.W. (2d) 824,
832 (Tex. Civ. App. 1946), aff'd per curiam, 331 U.S. 791, 67 S. Ct. 1523, 91
(613)
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by conservation legislation.4 So emphatically have Texas courts em-
braced this theory of ownership that upon occasion, they have held
that an oil and gas lease operates as a present sale of the oil and gas
in place.5 Summers concludes that: 6
Since the decision of Stephens County v. Mid-Kansas Oil & Gas Co.,
the Texas courts have steadily adhered to the principle that an oil and
gas lease, regardless of the character of the granting clause, creates in the
lessee a corporeal defeasible or determinable fee interest in the oil and gas.
With the lessee given so dignified an interest, one might well predict
that full use of possessory remedies would be allowed him. And this is
generally true.
Texas has replaced common law ejectment with a statutory remedy
of trespass to try title.7 In keeping with the property interest acquired
by the oil and gas lessee, he is allowed to utilize this action to protect
his mineral estate for the following reasons: 8
L. Ed. 1820 (1947); Brown v. Humble Oil & Refining Co., 126 Tex. 296, 83
S.W. (2d) 935, 940 (1935). See also Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Blankenship,
85 F. (2d) 553, 554-5 (5th Cir. 1936).
4 When Texas courts are confronted with the problem of the effect the
conservation statutes have upon the theory of ownership in place, they find the
rule of capture cumbersome and frequently used by a lessee to contest the
proration allotment of the Railroad Commission. In Marrs v. Railroad Commis-
sion, 142 Tex. 293, 177 S.W. (2d) 941, 948-9 (1944), the court pointed out that
oil and gas in place can be owned by a lessee under an oil and gas lease. It
further stated that, because of the lessee's interest in the oil and gas, to limit
the production would be to allow the lessee's property to be dissipated by
drainage to adjoining property. Such drainage could be halted if the rule of
capture alone controlled. The court held the proration an illegal deprivation of
property and allowed the lessee to increase his production, thereby stemming a
portion of the drainage.
5 Southern Oil Co. v. Colquitt, 28 Tex. Civ. App. 292, 69 S.W. 169, 171
(1902). See also Howell v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 140 F. (2d) 765,
767 (5th Cir. 1944), where a federal court ruled that "Under the law of Texas
an oil lease is a present sale of oil and gas in place."
6 1 SUMMaERS, OIL AND GAS § 165 (2d ed. 1938); accord, Big Lake Oil Co.
v. Reagan County, 217 S.W. (2d) 171, 173 (Tex. Civ. App. 1948); Corzelius v.
Harreil, 143 Tex. 509, 186 S.W. (2d) 961, 964 (1945); Normandie Oil Corp. v.
Oil Trading Co., 139 Tex. 402, 163 S.W. (2d) 179, 181-2 (1942).
7 Tax. STAT., Rav. Civ. art. 7364 (1948): "All fictitious proceedings in the
action of ejectment are abolished. The method of trying titles to lands, tenements
or other real property shall be by an action of trespass to try title."
8 Watkins v. Certain-Teed Products Corp., 231 S.W. (2d) 981, 985 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1950). True, this case involved not a conventional oil and gas lease,
but instead an absolute deed conveying "all of the gypsum . . . and all other
minerals of any kind whatsoever. . . ." Id. at 982. But in Texas even the ortho-
dox delay rental type of oil and gas lease conveys absolute title to the oil and
gas in place, subject to defeasance. Sheppard v. Stanolind Oil & Gas Co., 125
S.W. (2d) 643 (Tex. Civ. App. 1939). Thus, until condition broken, by failure
to drill, produce, or pay delay rentals, an absolute deed and an oil and gas
lease are similar in operative effect. This conclusion is strengthened by the words
of the court in Stephans County v. Mid-Kansas Oil & Gas Co., 113 Tex. 160,
NOTES
. . . possession of the surface after severance of the mineral from the
surface estate will not affect ownership of the mineral estate; . . . fee
ownership of mineral estate is of equal dignity as surface estate ....
When the holder of an oil and gas lease uses this remedy to assert
his title to the mineral estate, he is under the burden of establishing
his own title under the lease and he cannot recover on the weakness
of his lessor's title.9
The right of the lessee to compel specific performance, though
recognized in Texas, may be limited in some instances. For example,
in Elder v. Miller,10 where the plaintiff sought to enforce, in his favor
as lessee, a lease of the oil, gas and mineral rights, it was held that
the action must be brought in the county wherein the land lies because
"oil and gas in place are realty, and . . . the conveyance of the same,
even by a so-called mineral lease, is nevertheless a conveyance of an
interest in land." 3
Partition in Texas is governed by a statute 12 which has been
construed not to confer the right to compulsory partition upon the
lessee of one cotenant as against his lessor or other tenants.' 3 The
rationale here, rather simple but at variance with other holdings
which outline the nature of the lessee's interest, is that the interest
of the lessee and the lessor are not common interests, the estate of
the lessee being of less dignity and subservient to that of the land-
owner.14 This seems opposed to Watkins v. Certain-Teed Products
Corp.,15 which held that the lessee obtained a fee interest in the min-
eral estate equal in dignity to that of the surface estate. Of course,
the lessee or owner of an undivided one-half interest in an oil and gas
estate may compel partition.16
A lessee, by reason of the property interest he acquires under his
lease, may cause a receiver to be appointed to protect the property
254 S.W. 290, 294 (1923): ". . . there is no real difference in the title conveyed,
whether an instrument takes the form of a grant of the exclusive right to mine
and appropriate all of a certain mineral . . . or takes the form of a demise of
the land, for the sole purpose of mining operations, coupled with a grant of the
exclusive right to produce and dispose of the mineral . . . or takes the form of
a grant of the mineral with the exclusive right to mine for, produce, and dispose
thereof. .. "
9 Morrissey v. Amburgey, 292 S.W. 255, 256 (Tex. Civ. App. 1927).
10 116 S.W. (2d) 1171 (Tex. Civ. App. 1938).
11 Id. at 1173.
12 TEx. STAT., REv. Cw. art. 6082 (1948): "Any joint owner or claimant
of ... petroleum, or gas lands, whether held in fee or by lease or otherwise, may
compel a partition thereof between joint owners or claimants thereof. .. ."
13 Medina Oil Development Co. v. Murphy, 233 S.W. 333 (Tex. Civ. App.
1921).
'4 Id. at 334.
15 231 S.W. (2d) 981 (Tex. Civ. App. 1950).
16 Henderson v. Chesley, 273 S.W. 299 (Tex. Civ. App. 1925), aff'd, 116 Tex.
355, 292 S.W. 156 (1927).
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from a trespassing party who has drilled upon his lease or who has
trespassed beneath the surface and has a well bottomed upon the
lessee's property. 17 However, in order to be allowed this remedy, the
lessee cannot wait until the well of the trespasser is ready to be
brought in before objecting. He will be estopped from obtaining a
receiver unless he attempts to obtain an injunction or sequestration
within a reasonable time after he becomes aware of the trespass.' 8
In either instance, a surface or subsurface trespass, the lessee is
entitled to receivership because the oil or gas that the receiver
is taking from the ground belongs to him.
II.
Pennsylvania
As in Texas, the ownership in place theory is given judicial blessing
in Pennsylvania. One of its courts, in Westmoreland & Cambria Nat.
Gas Co. v. De Witt, stated: 19
They [oil and gas] belong to the owner of the land, and are part
of it, so long as they are on or in it, and are subject to his control;
but when they escape, and go into other land, or come under another's
control, the title of the former owner is gone.
From this position one would expect the same approach to remedies
as in Texas: that peculiarities in lease verbiage give way to an
interpretation in which a full property interest passes to the lessee.
But this is not the case.
Instead, Pennsylvania courts rely upon the phraseology of the
granting clause to determine the nature and extent of the lessee's
interest, and ultimately his remedies. As clearly explained elsewhere,
20
an instrument giving merely the right to enter and operate for minerals
is similar to an English mining license,2 1 and the holder of the right
17 Simmons v. East Texas Oil Refining Co., 68 S.W. (2d) 302 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1933); Guffey v. Stroud, 16 S.W. (2d) 527 (Tex. Comm. of App. 1929).
18 Simmons v. East Texas Oil Refining Co., 68 S.W. (2d) 302, 305 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1933).
19 130 Pa. 235, 18 At. 724, 725 (1889).
20 1 SUmmERS, op. cit. supra note 6, § 155; 3 SummERs, op. cit. supra note
6, § 532; Comment, Interests Created by Oil and Gas Leases in Pennsylvania,
4 U. oF PrlT. L. Rav. 274, 277-80 (1938).
21 "Much confusion as to the true nature of the legal interest created by
oil and gas leases is due to the unfortunate usage by the English courts of the
term 'license' to distinguish between the legal interest created by certain types
of grants for the purpose of mining solid minerals, one of which they called
a 'mining license' and the other a 'mining lease.'...
The English authorities have defined the interest created by a so-called license
to mine as an irrevocable, assignable, nonpossessory, or incorporeal interest in
land.. . ." 1 SumMims, op. cit. supra note 6, § 154.
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cannot protect himself through use of ejectment,2 2 until he enters
and produces oil or gas.23 But if the granting clause speaks of a
lease of the land, even though merely for the sole and only purpose
of mining and operating for oil and other minerals, then a corporeal
hereditament, giving the lessee the remedy of ejectment, is raised.2 4
But, to be sure, as in Texas, an absolute conveyance of the minerals,
including the oil and gas in place, can be accomplished by means of
a mineral deed, if the words used definitely evince the intent.25
Turning to trespass, it is patent that only the lessee with the
"license" type lease will be interested in trespass quare clausum fregit
as a remedy to protect his rights in the premises. And this lessee is
given this action.20 On the other hand, the lessee who has the "lease"
type, since he has a corporeal interest, will find more effective relief
in ejectment. And, of course, there is no question raised here about
the use of trespass de bonis asportatis or trover where oil or gas,
either severed initially by the plaintiff or by the wrongdoer, has been
tortiously taken. Presumably Pennsylvania would sanction application
of these devices.27
In connection with injunctive relief, or negative specific perform-
ance, the Pennsylvania theory of ownership has played a unique, de-
cisive role. Complainants in a prominent case 2 8 had obtained a lease
of land for oil and gas purposes. The lessor, claiming forfeiture by
the complainants, leased the same land to the respondents for oil and
gas operations. When the complainants sued to enjoin respondents'
drilling, the master ruled that the complainants, though they were
controlling the only well into the producing formation, were out of
possession, and that the lessor, admittedly in command of the surface,
22 E.g., Kelly v. Keys, 213 Pa. 295, 62 Ad. 911, 912-3 (1906). But it should
be noted that this case has been discounted to some extent. One Pennsylvania
court has remarked that Barnsdall v. Bradford Gas Co., 225 Pa. 338, 74 Atl. 207
(1909), "corrected an oversight in the Kelly Case and in effect overruled the
earlier case as a reference to the leases set forth in the paper books in those
cases will show. In the earlier [Kelly] case the lease was treated as a mere
license which was contrary to many previous decisions. . . ." Appeal of Baird,
132 Pa. Super. 573, 1 A. (2d) 485, 489 (1938), aff'd, 334 Pa. 410, 6 A. (2d)
306 (1939).
23 E.g., Karns v. Tanner, 66 Pa. 297, 307-8 (1871).
24 Barnsdall v. Bradford Gas Co., 225 Pa. 338, 74 Atl. 207, 209 (1909).
25 Penn-Ohio Gas Co. v. Frank's Heirs, 322 Pa. 233, 185 At]. 280, 281-2
(1936); McIntosh v. Ropp, 233 Pa. 497, 82 Atl. 949, 954 (1912).
26 See, e.g., Union Petroleum Co. v. Bliven Petroleum Co., 72 Pa. 173, 182-3
(1872).
27 See Valley Smokeless Coal Co. v. Hager, 292 Pa. 440, 141 Atl. 257 (1928),
which involved the wrongful taking of coal. No Pennsylvania case directly in
point was found.
28 Westmoreland & Cambria Nat. Gas Co. v. De Witt, 130 Pa. 235, 18 Atl.
724 (1889).
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was in. This, according to the master, allowed the lessor to lease the
same land to the respondents. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
reversed and granted the injunction on the ground that 29
The real subject of possession to which complainant is entitled under
the lease was the oil or gas contained in . . . the land. The learned
master says gas is a mineral, and while in sitau is part of the land, and
therefore [the lessor's] possession of the land is possession of the gas.
After pointing out that, contrary to the master's theory, oil and gas
are owned by the owner of the surface only until they escape or come
under another's control, the court ruled that the complainants had,
by means of their well, taken control of the gas in issue, were thus
in possession, and had not forfeited their lease. No difficulties, such
as lack of contract mutuality, were encountered, or, if so, they went
unmentioned.
Pennsylvania has no statute expressly allowing partition, either




Musgrave v. Musgrave 31 shows that West Virginia supports the
ownership in place theory. The court there announced: 32
That oil and gas are minerals and belong to the owner of the land
cannot be denied. They are the property of him upon whose land they
are produced. It is true that it is generally believed, and it may be con-
ceded, that these minerals are more or less vagrant in their character.
They do not persist in the same position in the earth at all times,
but the owner of land has the right to develop the same for the purpose
of producing oil and gas, and, if in the course of this development oil
or gas from adjacent lands escapes to his premises, it belongs to him;
and, vice versa....
So much is clear. The character of the interest passed to a lessee under
an oil and gas lease is not so well outlined.33
29 Id., 18 Ati. at 725.
30 Wedemeyer v. Rhodes, 70 Pitts. L. 3. 1057 (1922); Clever's Estate, 40
Pitts. L. 3. 358 (Orphans Ct. 1893), aff'd per curiam, In re Clever's Estate, 154
Pa. 481, 25 Atl. 814 (1893). Both cases are cited in the annotations of PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 12, § 1694 (1931).
31 86 W. Va. 119, 103 S.E. 302 (1920).
32 Id.,'103 S.E. at 303.
33 In fact, as Summers indicates, 1 Su r. ms, op. cit. supra note 6, § 157,
West Virginia courts have called the lessee's interest real estate, Carter v. Tyler
County Court, 45 W. Va. 806, 32 S.E. 216, 218 (1889) (a tax case), and also
personal property, Charter v. Maxwell, ....W. Va....., 52 S.E. (2d) 753, 759 (1949).
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Generally speaking, the lessee's interest is inchoate until discovery
of oil and gas.3 4 At that time, his interest, either a right to produce 35
or title to the oil and gas,36 vests. As an ordinary lessee, he is still
bound by the obligations found in the lease and restricted to the term
specified.37
Though taxation cases, which sometimes stretch and distort prop-
erty law, are largely responsible, it is safe to say that -the lessee's
interest after discovery of oil and gas is a chattel real,38 taxable as
personalty,39 and subject to a lien of execution.40
In West Virginia, ejectment may be brought by any person claim-
ing "real estate" either as heir, devisee, purchaser, or otherwise. 41
Consequently, to be logical, the courts would be required to deny this
remedy to an oil and gas lessee, since he claims a chattel real and
not real estate. In Hall v. Vernon,42 involving partition, the court
stated that a grant of oil and gas passes nothing for which ejectment
will lie.
If a stranger wrongfully extracts oil and gas from land held by a
lessee under an oil and gas lease, a trespass results.43 The lessee can
34 E.g., Parish Fork Oil Co. v. Bridgewater Gas Co., 51 W. Va. 583, 42
S.E. 655, 658 (1902).
35 Harris v. Michael, 70 W. Va. 356, 73 S.E. 934, 936 (1912): "It is assuredly
true that where a lessee enters upon the leased premises and discovers oil or gas
his right to produce the oil or gas becomes a vested right."
36 Core v. New York Petroleum Co., 52 W. Va. 276, 43 S.E. 128, 129 (1903):
"Under the authorities, whenever oil is discovered and produced under a lease
of the character of the one in question, estate and property in the oil and gas
underlying -the premises is vested in the lessee and his assigns." Though the
inconsistency between this case and the Harris decision is obvious, Harris, decided
nine years later, does not mention Core.
37 For an excellent discussion of West Virginia law on this point, supported
by citations, see Hutchinson v. McCue, 101 F. (2d) 111, 116-7 (4th Cir. 1939),
cert. denied, 308 U.S. 564, 60 S. Ct. 75, 84 L. Ed. 473 (1939).
38 Charter v. Maxwell, ....W. Va., 52 SE. (2d) 753, 759 (1949).
39 Harvey Coal & Coke Co. v. Dillon, 59 W. Va. 605, 53 S.E 928, 930-8
(1905).
40 Drainer v. Travis, 116 W. Va. 390, 180 S.E. 435, 436-7 (1935).
41 V. VA. CODE ANN. § 5419 (1949).
42 47 V. Va. 295, 34 S.E. 764, 765 (1899) (concurring opinion): "A grant
to the oil and gas passes nothing for which ejectment will lie. It is a right, not
to the oil in the ground, but to the oil the grantee may find."
43 E.g., Pittsburgh & West Virginia Gas Co. v. Pentress Gas Co., 84 W. Va.
449, 100 S.E. 296 (1919). When pressed to explain how the plaintiffs, holders of
an oil and gas lease, a mere chattel real, could sue in trespass for injury to land,
the court answered, id., 100 S.E. at 299: "This can make no difference in the
application of the principle, for the reason that the trespass committed here was
to the plaintiffs' rights, regardless of what they were. Admittedly plaintiffs had
the exclusive right to drill this land for oil and gas, and the defendants wrong-
fully took this right from them. . . . [Ilt makes no difference as to the extent
of the plaintiffs' interests, the result is that they have been deprived of them,
and that by the defendants' unwarranted acts." This analysis leaves much to be
desired.
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recover damages for the injury inflicted upon the estate or he can
seek to recover the value of the oil and gas taken from the property.44
The measure of damages in the latter action is dependent on the
nature of the trespass: willful, or mistaken and inadvertent. If willful,
the measure is the value of the property at the time and place of
the demand without deduction for labor and other expenses. If the
trespass was unintentional and by mistake, the value of the article
after severance, less the proper expenses of the severance, will be
the measure of the damages. 4
5
To be expected is the rule that the lessee can sue to regain severed
oil and gas wrongfully taken. This proposition depends not at all
upon the theory of ownership in West Virginia, since oil and gas, once
removed from the ground, are admittedly personal property. The
lessee can rely upon trover for their conversion, detinue, or trespass
de bonis asportatis.46
There is nothing in the nature of an oil and gas lease to prevent
issuance of a decree for specific performance when the proper founda-
tion for this relief exists.47 West Virginia supports this rule.4 8 In the
usual case, the lessee has two remedies available: an action at law
for damages, and an action in equity for specific performance. The
latter is the only adequate remedy, since it is the only one that can
directly maintain the value of the leasehold interest.4 9 Therefore, in
Smith v. Root,50 equity had jurisdiction of a suit brought by a senior
lessee against his lessor and a junior lessee for specific execution of
his lease. As in Texas,5 1 there are limitations on the use of this remedy.
For example, equity will not grant specific performance when the
lessee has unreasonably delayed in performing his contract.52
Focusing attention on injunctive relief, one finds that the principal
ground for this form of remedial action is irreparable injury. 53 As
44 Id., 100 S.E. at 298.
45 Ibid.
46 Williamson v. Jones, 43 W. Va. 562, 27 S.E. 411, 413 (1897).
47 MORRISoN-DESOTO, OiL Am GAS RionTs 202 (1920).
48 An example is Eastern Oil Co. v. Coulehan, 65 W. Va. 531, 64 S.E. 836
(1909), though the court spoke in terms of injunctive relief to avoid forfeiture.
Id., 64 S.E. at 841.
49 Carnegie Natural Gas Co. v. South Penn Oil Co., 56 W. Va. 402, 49 S.E.
548, 553 (1904).
50 63 W. Va. 633, 66 S.E. 1005 (1910).
51 See text at note 10 supra.
52 Lowther Oil Co. v. Miller-Sibley Oil Co., 53 W. Va. 501, 44 S.E. 433,
436-7 (1903).
53 Bettman v. Harness, 42 W. Va. 433, 26 S.E. 271, 272-3 (1896). The
broad rule announced here, that injunctive relief will be afforded to prevent
irreparable injury to land even though the equity court will also decide questions
of legal title, was limited by Freer v. Davis, 52 W. Va. 1, 43 S.E. 164, 165
(1903), to oil and gas controversies where no fact-finding problems, such as
location of boundaries and markers, are involved.
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established above, oil and gas in place are considered part of the land
in West Virginia. Their wrongful extraction by one lawfully in posses-
sion is waste, and if by a stranger, it is trespass.54 In both situations,
it is irreparable injury which may be enjoined.
As to partition in this state, early vacillation has been transformed
into statutory certainty. In Hall v. Vernon,55 a partition of oil and
gas by joint owners not owning the surface was declared void. The
court held that equity has no jurisdiction to partition, in kind, prop-
erty rights in oil and gas. A concurring judge explained the court's
ruling: 56
Equity never undertakes to divide the unseen or invisible, but only
that which it cn see and measure so as to produce equality. Air, gas,
water, and oil are not susceptible of partition in kind, independent of
'land, either when hidden beneath the surface or floating above it, but
only when reduced to actual possession and control.
Although the rights and privileges to acquire possession of oil and gas
granted by an oil and gas lease are not susceptible of partition in
kind, later cases have decided that they might be sold and the pro-
ceeds dividedy 7 Therefore, the lessee of a co-tenant's mineral estate
in land is entitled to be paid, for the value of his lease, out of the
proceeds assigned to his lessor upon partition of the minerals by
sale.5 8 The legislature, following the reasoning of Hall v. Vernon,
amended the section on partition in the code to read: "Tenants in
common, joint tenants and coparceners of real property, including
minerals, and lessees of mineral rights other than lessees of oil and
gas minerals, shall be compelled to make partition. . . ." 59
Receivership is a recognized form of ancillary aid in West Virginia,60
but as is true of most of this state's remedies, its recognition is not
due to a direct influence of the theory of ownership or the nature of
the lessee's interest.
54 Williamson v. Jones, 43 W. Va. 562, 27 S.E. 411, 412-3 (1897). Difficult
as it is to understand why a lessee, holder of a chattel real interest, is allowed
to enjoin trespass or waste, these being injuries to real property, nevertheless
this is the rule in West Virginia. See notes 42 and 49 supra. If natural gas is
alone involved, then a statute, W. VA. CODE ANN. § 2479 (1949), can be relied
upon by the lessee in a suit to enjoin waste.
55 47 W. Va. 295, 34 S.E. 764 (1899).
56 Id., 34 S.E. at 765.
57 Hall v. Douglas, 104 W. Va. 286, 140 S.E. 4 (1927); Preston v. White,
57 W. Va. 278, 50 S.E. 236 (1905).
58 Hall v. Douglas, 104W. Va. 286, 140 S.E. 4, 5 (1927).
59 W. VA. CODE ANN. § 3640 (1949).
60 Ohio Fuel Co. v. Burdett, 72 W. Va. 803, 79 S.E. 667, 668 (1913). The
peculiar importance of this remedy warrants further discussion. The object of
the appointment of a receiver in a pending cause is the protection and preservation
of the subject in litigation from spoliation, waste, or deterioration. Commercial
Banking & Trust Co. v. Doddridge County Bank, 118 W. Va. 37, 188 S.E. 663,
666 (1936). A temporary injunction restricting operations will not in all cases
afford adequate relief, as when the land in dispute is being drained] by wells




Switching the focus of attention to the non-ownership theory, we
come first to California where one of its courts had this to say: 11
There are intimations of approval of the oil and gas in place doctrine
in some of the decisions in this state .... But other cases unequivocally
declare that the owner of land does not have an absolute title to oil
and gas in place as corporeal real property, but, rather, the exclusive
right on his premises to drill for oil and gas, and to retain as his
property all substances brought to the surface on his land.
Now, as far as the lessee's interest is concerned, California has long
held that his interest amounts to real estate for tax purposes. 62 How-
ever, before 1935 much confusion was to be found in California cases
which attempted definition of a lessee's interest. 63 Since that time,
the decisions have consistently adopted the view that the oil and gas
lessee receives the landowner's exclusive right to drill plus a right to
such possession of the property as may be required for drilling, but
that no ownership rights are created by the lease.64 According to
land in dispute is being drained by wells on adjoining lands, an injunction
restraining production would not preserve the status quo, and would be contrary
to the interests of the party who finally won in the title suit." 1 Summs, op.
cit. supra note 6, § 30. This is perhaps why a court may appoint a receiver to
produce the oil and gas as a matter of preservation, even without the consent
of the parties. Ohio Fuel Oil Co. v. Burdett, 72 W. Va. 803, 79 S.E. 667 (1913).
The application for appointment of a receiver is always addressed to the sound
discretion of the trial court. As stated in Spies v. Butts, 59 W. Va. 385, 53 S.E.
897, 901-2 (1906), "'. . . The appointment is not a matter of right. The power
to appoint a receiver is a discretionary one to be exercised with great circum-
spection. The discretion is not arbitrary or absolute, but sound and judicial. It is
not to be too strictly limited or lightly used. . . .'" Receivership is a harsh,
drastic and costly remedy, violently disturbing and interfering with the rights
of the party whose possession is thereby ousted. MomusoN - DESOTO, OIL AND
GAS RIGHTS 194 (1920). Therefore, before a receiver will be appointed, the
lessee must show a clear right to the property. However, equity jurisdiction will
not be defeated when the dispute, concerning the title, presents a question of law
only. Sult v. A. Hochstetter Oil Co., 63 W. Va. 317, 61 S.E. 307, 310 (1908).
61 Callahan v. Martin, 3 Cal. (2d) 110, 43 P. (2d) 788, 792 (1935).
62 Merchants' Trust Co. v. Hopkins, 103 Cal. App. 473, 284 Pac. 1072
(1930); Ventura County v. Barry, 207 Cal. 189, 277 Pac. 333 (1929); Mohawk
Oil Co. v. Hopkins, 196 Cal. 148, 236 Pac. 133 (1925).
63 An early California decision looked to the nature of the interest of the
lessee under a lease which gave him a right not only to drill for oil but also
to the possession of the surface in allowing him to maintain an action for
possession of the land against wrongful intrusion. The court noted that the lease
vested in the plaintiff ". . . a corporeal interest in the land, and estate for years,
with right of possession for a limited purpose." Chandler v. Hart, 161 Cal. 405,
119 Pac. 516, 524 (1911).
64 Schiffman v. Richfield Oil Co. of Cal., 8 Cal. (2d) 211, 64 P. (2d) 1081
(1937); Callahan v. Martin, 3 Cal. (2d) 110, 43 P. (2d) 788 (1935); Dabney-
Johnston Oil Corp. v. Walden, 4 Cal. (2d) 637, 52 P. (2d) 237 (1935).
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these cases, the lessee's interest, if it is to endure for years, is not
real property or real estate, but is an interest or estate in real prop-
erty in the nature of an incorporeal hereditament, a profit a prendre,
which is a chattel real. If it is to endure in perpetuity or for life,
it is a freehold and real estate as well as an estate in realty.65 Thus,
these decisions reject completely the ownership theory and the Texas
view that a lease creates a corporeal real property interest. 60
In view of this 1935 decision, Callahan v. Martin,6 7 which removed
judicial doubts found in earlier opinions by describing the lessee's
interest as an incorporeal hereditament, California courts must logi-
cally deny a lessee the use of ejectment or any similar suit for
possession of the land, because ejectment will not lie to recover an
incorporeal hereditament. 68
By statute, recovery of damages for underground trespass, wrongful
use or occupancy of real property by wells and for conversion of oil
and gas, is authorized. 69 This statute has been construed as not limited
to subterranean trespass, but applies to surface trespass as well.70
The courts of this jurisdiction have recognized a right in the lessee
to recover damages and obtain an accounting from an underground
trespasser for the oil removed, and he may receive injunctive relief
against continued trespass as well.71 The theory here is that the lessee
becomes the owner of the oil and gas when they are reduced to pos-
session on his leasehold, either by himself or by the trespasser. 72 The
exact moment at which this possession commences is unsettled. 7"3
65 Callahan v. Martin, 3 Cal. (2d) 110, 43 P. (2d) 788 (1935).
66 Dabney-Johnston Oil Corp. v. Walden, 4 Cal. (2d) 637, 52 P. (2d) 237,
243 (1935): "Thus, although the oil and gas in place doctrine is rejected, interests
in oil rights which are estates in real property may be granted separate and apart
from a grant of surface title."
67 3 Cal. (2d) 110, 43 P. (2d) 788 (1935).
68 City and County of San Francisco v. Grote, 5 Cal. Unrep. 612, 47 Pac.
938 (1897).
69 CAL. CODE CIV..PRoC. § 3494 (1949).
70 Standard Oil Co. of California v. United States, 107 F. (2d) 402, 417
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 309 U.S. 654, 60 S. Ct. 469, 84 L. Ed. 1003 (1940).
71 Union Oil Co. of California v. Domengeaux, 30 Cal. App. (2d) 266, 86
P. (2d) 166 (1939); Bell Corp. v. Bell View Oil Syndicate, 24 Cal. (2d) 587,
76 P. (2d) 167 (1938); Union Oil Co. of California v. Mutual Oil Co., 65 P.
(2d) 896 (Cal. App. 1937).
72 Pacific Western Oil Co. v. Bern Oil Co., 81 P. (2d) 207 (Cal. App. 1938),
aff'd, 13 Cal. (2d) 60, 87 P. (2d) 1045 (1939); Union Oil Co. of California v.
Mutual Oil Co., 65 P. (2d) 896 (Cal. App. 1937).
73 See People v. Associated Oil Co., 211 Cal. 93, 294 Pac. 717, 721 (1930),
which quotes with approval a United States Supreme Court case originating in
West Virginia, saying: "If an adjoining owner drills his own land, and taps a
deposit of oil and gas, extending under his neighbor's field, so that it comes into
his well, it becomes his property."
But Union Oil Co. of California v. Mutual Oil Co., 65 P. (2d) 896, 899 (Cal.
App. 1937), holds that "When oil is moved from the ground by either the lessee
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However, a logical basis for an action of trespass against realty would
be that possession and, consequently, the title pass when the oil and
gas enter the lessee's well, because they would still be realty until re-
moved from the earth. 74 Under this view, the requisite possession and
claim of title would be present.
California by statute 7 5 denies specific performance against one
party to an obligation "unless the other party thereto has performed,
or is compellable specifically to perform, everything to which the
former is entitled under the same obligation, either completely or
nearly so, together with full compensation for any want of entire
performance." With this statute in mind, California courts have con-
sistently held that an agreement to execute an oil and gas lease under
which the lessee could abandon at will is not specifically enforceable
by him because lacking in mutuality.7 6 The court in Pimentel v. Hall-
Baker Co.77 pointed out that "Where, as is usual, the obligations of
an oil lease are not mutual and reciprocal and there is no mutuality
of remedies, an action for specific performance cannot be maintained
by one party -against another." However, as pointed out in a subse-
quent California case, Gavina v. Smith,78 the decisions arriving at
this rule all involved actions to enforce agreements to execute a lease,
no lease having been executed. The Gavina court continued: 79
. . . and there is no analogy between a lease that is perfectly valid in
itself but subject to conditions subsequent that may at some future time
bring it to an end and an instrument that so far lacks mutuality that it
can be terminated at any time by the lessee under it.
Thus, it would seem that the cases denying specific performance of
unexecuted agreements to execute a lease have no effect upon actions
for specific performance of an executed lease.
By statute,80 California allows partition "When several cotenants
own real property as joint tenants, or tenants in common, in which
one or more of them have an estate of inheritance, or for life or
or a trespasser, it becomes personal property and, . . . we are of the opinion
that title to and the right to possession of the oil so removed becomes vested
in the lessee holding the exclusive right to remove such oil from the premises."
74 Nonamaker v. Amos, 73 Ohio St. 163, 76 N.E. 949 (1905); Kelley v.
Ohio Oil Co., 57 Ohio St. 317, 49 N.E. 399 (1897); Williamson v. Jones, 43 W. Va.
562, 27 S.E. 411 (1897).
75 CAL. Civ. CODE § 3386 (1949).
76 Pimentel v. Hall-Baker Co., 32 Cal. App. (2d) 697, 90 P. (2d) 588 (1939);
George v. Weston, 26 Cal. App. (2d) 256, 79 P. (2d) 110 (1938); Moore v.
Heron, 108 Cal. App. 705, 292 Pac. 136 (1930); Sheehan v. Vedder, 108 Cal. App.
419, 292 Pac. 175 (1930); Dabney v. Key, 57 Cal. App. 762, 207 Pac. 921 (1922).
77 32 Cal. App. (2d) 697, 90 P. (2d) 588, 591 (1939).
78 148 P. (2d) 890 (Cal. App.), rev'd on other grounds, 25 Cal. (2d) 501,
154 P. (2d) 681 (1944).
79 148 P. (2d) at 891.
80 CAL. COD CIv. PROC. § 752 (1949).
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lives, or for years. .. ." Since, as noted above,8 ' the oil and gas lessee
in California has an incorporeal hereditament, which is an estate of
inheritance,8 2 he should be able to obtain partition against a cotenant
of the leasehold. As pointed out in Bacon v. Wakrhaftig,8 3 the rights
of any lessee of an oil and gas lease must be set forth in the complaint,
since these parties are necessary and proper to the action. Thus, if
these parties are necessary to another's suit for partition, it should
follow that they could also bring partition.
The appointment of receivers is authorized by the California Code
of Civil Procedure 84
In an action . . . between partners or others jointly owning or
interested in any property or fund, on the application of the plaintiff,
or of any party whose right to or interest in the property or funds,
or the proceeds thereof, is probable, and where it is shown that the




Watford Oil & Gas Co. v. Shipman,85 an Illinois decision, contains
a clear statement of the theory of ownership used in that state:
In the eye of the law oil and natural gas are treated as minerals,
but they possess certain peculiar attributes not common to other minerals
which have a fixed and permanent situs. Owing to their liability to
escape, these minerals are not capable of distinct ownership in place.
... It [a grant of the oil and gas] is a grant, not of the oil that is in
the ground, but to such part thereof as the grantee may find.
Illinois courts agree that the interest obtained by a lessee under an
oil and gas lease, if unlimited in duration, is a freehold. 86 A freehold
has been defined in Illinois "as any estate of inheritance or for life
in either a corporeal or incorporeal hereditament -existing in or arising
from real property of free tenure." 87
As applied to the oil and gas lease, it would appear that, since
the lessee does not own any of the oil and gas until found, his lease-
81 See note 66 supra.
82 See note 65 supra.
83 97 Cal. App. (2d) 599, 218 P. (2d) 144 (1950).
84 CAL. CODE CiV. PROC. § 564 (1949).
85 233 Ill. 9, 84 N.E. 53, 54 (1908).
86 Chicago, Wilmington & Franklin Coal Co. v. Minier, 127 F. (2d) 1006,
1009 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 669, 63 S. Ct. 74, 87 L. Ed. 538 (1942);
Transcontinental Oil Co. v. Emmerson, 298 Ill. 394, 131 N.E. 645 (1921); Ohio
Oil Co. v. Daughetee, 240 Il1. 361, 88 N.E. 818 (1909).
87 Fowler v. Marion & Pittsburg Coal Co., 315 Ill. 312, 146 N.E. 318, 319
(1924). "Hereditament" is the most comprehensive term of description applicable
to real estate. In re Handley's Estate, 208 Pa. 388, 57 At. 755 (1904). It includes
everything which is capable of being inherited. Callahan v. Martin, 3 Cal. (2d)
110, 43 P. (2d) 788 (1935).
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hold rights would be more in the nature of an incorporeal hereditament,
which is a right arising out of a thing corporate, whether real or per-
sonal, or concerning, or annexed to, or exercisable within it.88 How-
ever, Illinois does not follow this view in dealing with taxation cases.
Courts in Illinois instead hold that, despite the incapability of abso-
lute ownership of oil and gas, if the lessee has the right under the
lease to go on the land and carry on normal operations to find and
produce gas, a corporeal, tangible freehold estate passes for tax pur-
poses. 89
Dealing with ejectment, dictum in Watford shows that "A grant
to the oil and gas passes nothing which can be the subject of an
ejectment or other real action." 90 This case has generally been fol-
lowed in Illinois in denying ejectment to the lessee of an oil and gas
lease.91 The decisions relied upon in Watford, in refusing ejectment
to the lessee, all based their refusal on the lack of a corporeal interest,
the interest required as the subject of this real action.92 Any deviation
in theory found in tax cases should be credited to a desire to give full
effect to the state's policy of taxation, and should not be deemed
significant in matters of orthodox property law.93
Illinois has allowed the lessee to recover damages in trespass for
removal of oil from the leasehold,94 and to obtain an accounting for
past removal.95 Injunctive relief to prevent its continuance is also
88 Lake v. Sealy, 231 Ala. 466, 165 So. 399, 401 (1936), holding that interests
in oil and gas leases, landlords' royalties and oil, gas and mineral rights are
incorporeal hereditaments. See also Rich v. Doneghey, 71 Okla. 204, 177 Pac. 86,
89 (1918), holding that the granted or reserved right to oil and gas is an
incorporeal hereditament, or, more specifically, a profit a prendre, analogous to a
profit to hunt and fish on another's land.
89 Transcontinental Oil Co. v. Emmerson, 298 I1. 394, 131 N.E. 645, 649
(1921): "The conveyance, however, of the right to enter upon the land for the
purpose of prospecting and operating for oil and gas, laying pipe lines, and
building powers, stations, and structures to produce, save, and care for the
products is a conveyance of an interest in the land itself, which, if of indefinite
duration, is a freehold estate in the land."
90 223 Ill. 9, 84 N.E. 53, 54 (1908).
91 Guffey v. Smith, 237 U.S. 101, 35 S. Ct. 526, 59 L. Ed. 856 (1915); Carter
Oil Co. v. Liggett, 371 IIl. 482, 21 N.E. (2d) 569 (1939); Gillespie v. Fulton Oil
& Gas Co., 236 11. 188, 86 N.E. 219 (1908).
92 Dark v. Johnston, 55 Pa. 164 (1867); Hall v. Vernon, 47 W. Va. 295,
34 S.E. 764 (1899); Wood County Petroleum Co. v. West Virginia Transportation
Co., 28 W. Va. 210 (1886).
93 Chicago, Wilmington & Franklin Coal Co. v. Minier, 127 F. (2d) 1006
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 669, 63 S. Ct. 74, 87 L. Ed. 538 (1942);
Updike v. Smith, 378 I1]. 600, 39 N.E. (2d) 325, 328 (1942); Transcontinental
Oil Co. v. Emmerson, 298 Ill. 394, 131 N.E. 645 (1921).
94 Superior Oil Co. v. Harsh, 50 F. Supp. 358 (E.D. Ill. 1943).
95 Shell Oil Co. v. Manley Oil Corp., 50 F. Supp. 21 (E.D. fl. 1942). An
Illinois oil lessee was able to obtain a directional survey of the wells of an
adjoining producer to determine whether they were bottomed upon his lease.
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available.96 Some doubt resulted from these holdings because the mea-
sure of damages against a good faith and against a bad faith trespasser
was identical. A distinction was drawn between the two by a later
Illinois case which held that a good faith trespasser would be entitled
to credit for drilling expenses, whereas a willful trespasser would not.
97
This state affords equitable relief to an oil and gas lessee faced
with trespass, waste, or other irreparable injury to his freehold.98 Al-
though often termed specific performance, this remedy in its essence
is instead a prohibitory injunction. 99 Because of the presence of the
surrender clause in favor of the lessee, the earlier decisions in this
jurisdiction refused equitable relief to the lessee either on the ground
of lack of mutuality 100 or because of the policy of equity courts
which frowns upon rendering a decree which one of the parties could
nullify. 101 However, a more liberal trend, noticeable in the later Illi-
nois cases, generally favors the use of equity's injunction and bill to
remove cloud on title.' 02 This relief is "to protect a present vested
leasehold, amounting to a freehold interest, from continuing and irre-
parable injury calculated to accomplish its practical destruction." 103
Ejectment being unavailable to the lessee, the courts ruled that he
consequently had no adequate remedy at law. 10 4
Even though a statute 105 expressly allows partition of lands, tene-
ments or hereditaments, the holders of interests under oil and gas
The plaintiff alleged underground trespass and such a survey appeared to be the
only method of checking his claim. Texas Co. v. Hollingsworth, 304 Ill. App.
607, 27 N.E. (2d) 67 (1940), rev'd for lack of necessary parties, 375 Ill. 536,
31 N.E. (2d) 944 (1941).
96 Shell Oil Co. v. Manley Oil Corp., 50 F. Supp. 21 (E.D. Ill. 1942).
97 Lambach v. Town of Mason, 386 Ill. 41, 53 N.E. (2d) 601, 607 (1944).
98 Guffey v. Smith, 237 U.S. 101, 35 S. Ct. 526, 59 L. Ed. 856 (1915);
Carter Oil Co. v. Owen, 27 F. Supp. 74 (E.D. Ill. 1939); Carter Oil Co. v.
Liggett, 371 I1. 482, 21 N.E. (2d) 569 (1939); Gillespie v. Fulton Oil & Gas
Co., 236 Ill. 188, 86 N.E. 219 (1908).
99 Guffey v. Smith, 237 U.S. 101, 35 S. Ct. 526, 59 L. Ed. 856 (1915).
100 Minnetonka Oil Co. v. Boyd, 143 Ill. App. 479 (1908); Ulrey v. Keith,
237 Ill. 284, 86 N.E. 696 (1908).
101 Watford Oil & Gas Co. v. Shipman, 233 Ill. 9, 84 N.E. 53 (1908).
102 Carter Oil Co. v. Owen, 27 F. Supp. 74, 77 (E.D. Ill. 1939): "Thus,
under the law of Illinois, it is established that the title under such an oil lease
is a freehold; that to protect the same, equity has jurisdiction to remove clouds
and to prevent waste and irreparable injury, there being no complete remedy
at law." See also Gillespie v. 'Fulton Oil & Gas Co., 236 Ill. 188, 86 N.E. 219
(1908). For the requirements to remove clouds, see ILL. STAT. ArNN. c. 106, § 13
(Jones 1936).
103 Guffey v. Smith, 237 U.S. 101, 35 S. Ct. 526, 530, 59 L. Ed. 856 (1915).
104 Guffey v. Smith, 237 U.S. 101, 35 S. Ct. 526, 59 L. Ed. 856 (1915);
Carter Oil Co. v. Liggett, 371 Ill. 482, 21 N.E. (2d) 569 (1939); Gillespie v.
Fulton Oil & Gas Co., 236 Ill. 188, 86 N.E. 219 (1908).
105 Im,. STAT. ANN. c. 109, § 490 (4) (Jones Cum. Supp. 1949).
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leases have been consistently denied partition.10 6 In Watford, the
court said partition in this instance was denied because "A lease of
land to enter and prospect for oil is a grant of a privilege to enter
and prospect, but does not give a title to the oil or gas until such
products are found." 107 But the court also pointed out that the lease
would create a freehold if unlimited in ultimate possible duration as
was the lease then before it. Then, if it is a freehold which is in
Illinois an "estate of inheritance or for life in either a corporeal or
incorporeal hereditament," 108 it is difficult to comprehend why it is
not a hereditament within the statute discussed above which allowed
partition of hereditaments. Nevertheless, the Watford rule has been
uniformly upheld.' 0 9 A possible solution for the lessee might be in
the rule that the lessors may maintain partition. This allows each
oil and gas lease to attach to the portion of -the land set apart for
the respective lessor. 110 Thus, a lessee, finding it impossible to con-
tinue joint operations with his co-lessee, might prevail upon his lessor
to sue for partition and thus divide the underground interests.
In Carter Oil Co. v. McQuigg,11 1 it was held that a federal district
court, in a suit to enjoin interference with alleged rights of an oil and
gas lessee, had power to appoint a receiver to protect the interests of
everyone involved. The protection required was the drilling of offset
wells to safeguard the land from drainage. Receivership was denied,
however, in a later Illinois case 112 where the lessee sought to set
aside the leases of the defendant which were allegedly fraudulent. This
denial was based on the ground that receivership is an emergency
measure, available only in clear cases of fraud or immediate damage
to property. Further, it requires that the plaintiff show a clear right
to ihe property involved and a reasonable probability that the petition-
ing party will prevail in the suit.
106 Webster v. Hall, 388 Ill. 401, 58 N.E. (2d) 575, 578 (1944); Watford
Oil & Gas Co. v. Shipman, 233 Ill. 9, 84 N.E. 53 (1908).
107 Watford Oil & Gas Co. v. Shipman, 233 Ill. 9, 84 N.E. 53, 54 (1908).
The court also relied heavily, in denying partition, upon the fact that the lessee
could nullify any possible equitable decree for specific performance against him
by surrendering the lease upon payment of one dollar.
108 Fowler v. Marion & Pittsburg Coal Co., 315 Ill. 312, 146 N.E. 318, 319
(1924).
109 See, e.g., Webster v. Hall, 388 Ill. 401, 58 N.E. (2d) 575 (1944). An
interesting case which seems contra in principle to Watford is Rohn v. Harris,
130 Ill. 525, 22 N.E. 587, 588 (1889), in which the court, in granting partition
of a ferry franchise, said: "Strictly speaking . . . a ferry franchise is not real
estate, but it partakes so far of the nature of real estate that . . . it may be
partitioned in the same manner as real property." Considering that Watlord
refused partition primarily because the oil and gas lessee's interest was not real
estate, the distinguishing reasons for the decision are obscure. In each case thtr
was merely a grant of a privilege.
110 Zeigler v. Brenneman, 237 Ill. 15, 86 N.E. 597, 601 (1908).
111 112 F. (2d) 275, 281 (7th Cir. 1940).





Oil and gas are fugitive minerals, and the owners of the lands which
contain such deposits are not the owners of the oil and gas until they
reduce these fugitive minerals to actual possession. The owners of land
have a real right in their property to go upon it and explore it for
these minerals, in order to gain ownership thereof by securing possession
of them.
An oil and gas lease in Louisiana does not convey a separate estate
in the oil and gas, but merely a right to go on the land for exploration
and exploitation purposes. 1 1 4 On various occasions, the courts have
spoken of an oil and gas lease as a sale, 1 1 5 as both sale and lease,1 1 6
as a lease 117 and as a real right.1 1 8 Then, finally, came State ex rel.
Bush v. United Gas Public Service Co.1 1 where it was said that it is
"no longer a debatable question in this State" that a lessee under an
oil and gas lease owns a servitude.
Because an oil and gas lease is not governed by the rules governing
ordinary leases,' 2 0 it was held in Nabors Oil & Gas Co. v. Louisiana
Oil Refining Co., 121 that the rule denying a lessee the right to dispute
his lessor's title during the term has no application to a. lease of
mineral rights.
Gulf Refining Co. of Louisiana v. Glassell 122 held that a lessee
in the usual mineral lease "merely obtains an obligatory or personal
right but not a real right - a jus in re." According to the court, an
oil and gas lease had the status of" an ordinary lease of a farm, for
instance, and the lessee's rights were accordingly limited to an action
113 Gulf Refining Co. of Louisiana v. Glassell, 186 La. 190, 171 So. 846, 849
(1936). See also Federal Land Bank of New Orleans v. Mulhern, 180 La. 627,
157 So. 370, 373 (1934); Commissioner v. Gray, 159 F. (2d) 834, 837 (5th Cir.
1947).
114 Frost-Johnson Lumber Co. v. Salling's Heirs, 150 La. 756, 91 So. 207,
243 (1922).
115 Nabors Oil & Gas Co. v. Louisiana Oil Refining Co., 151 La. 361, 91 So.
765 (1922).
116 Rives v. Gulf Refining Co. of Louisiana, 133 La. 178, 62 So. 623, 625
(1913).
117 Spence v. Lucas, 138 La. 763, 70 So. 796, 798 (1915).
118 Vander Sluys v. Finfrock, 158 La. 175, 103 So. 730, 732 (1925).
119 185 La. 496, 169 So. 523, 524 (1936).
120 Nabors v. Producers Oil Co., 140 La. 985, 74 So. 527 (1917); Cooke v.
Gulf Refining Co., 135 La. 609, 65 So. 758, 759 (1914); Rives v. Gulf Refining
Co., 133 La. 178, 62 So. 623, 624-5 (1913).
121 151 La. 361, 91 So. 765, 778 (1922).
122 186 La. 190, 171 So. 846, 849 (1936). For a discussion of the Glassell
decision, see Wilson, Recent Developments in Louisiana Oil and Gas Laws, 11
TUtLANE L. Riyv. 553, 565 (1937).
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for damages against the lessor.' 23 This decision, being at variance
with Nabors and the chain of cases which preceded it, startled the
legal fraternity. 124 Consequently, the effect of this Glassell view was
soon erased by legislation: 125
That oil, gas and other mineral leases . . . are hereby defined . . .
as real rights and incorporeal immovable property, and may be asserted,
protected and defended in the same manner as may be the ownership or
possession of other immovable property by the holder of such rights,
without the concurrence, joinder or consent of the landowner, and
without impairment of rights of warranty, in any action or by any
procedure available to the owner of immovable property or land.
Later, however, this statute was judicially limited to affect procedural
matters alone, 126 and the legislature again stepped in. This time the
amendatory statute allowed no doubt that rights of substance were
to be altered: 127
This Section shall be considered as substantive as well as procedural
so that the owners of oil, gas and other mineral leases . . . shall have
the benefit of all laws relating to the owners of real rights in immovable
property or real estate.
The broad language of the amendatory act apparently makes such
rights real for all purposes, thus precluding a limitation similar to the
one placed on the first statute.128 Therefore, it appears today that a
mineral servitude in Louisiana is a terminable property right.129
Trespass was in issue in Gliptis v. Fifteen Oil Co. 1 30 Under the
terms of the contract, the plaintiff was given the exclusive right to
extract minerals from the earth in a given radius of 300 feet. The
defendant drilled a well only 33 feet from the 300 foot radius, and
the plaintiff sued to recover damages for killing his well. The court
ruled that this subsurface invasion amounted to a trespass, that the
plaintiff had the exclusive right to explore his land and that this
necessarily excluded the right of any other person to invade the sub-
surface of the land involved. The court concluded with the statement
that it could enjoin the continuous trespass and that it had the in-
herent power to order a well survey to determine whether a trespass
actually occurred. 1"1
123 See Comment, 11 TurANx L. Rzv. 607 (1937).
124 See Morrison, The Need for a Revision of the Louisiana Civil Code, 11
TuLANE L. REv. 213, 242 (1937).
125 La. Acts 1938, No. 205, § 1.
126 Lawrence v. Sun Oil Co., 166 F. (2d) 466, 469 (5th Cir. 1948); Wier v.
Grubb, 215 La. 967, 41 So. (2d) 846, 847 (1949).
127 LA. Rav. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 1105 (West 1951).
128 See Legis., 11 LA. L. Rv. 22, 32-4 (1950).
129 Haynes v. King, 219 La. 160, 52 So. (2d) 531, 538 (1950). As to the
nature of a mineral interest in Louisiana in general, see Comment, 25 TuLAE
L. REv. 497 (1951).
130 204 La. 896, 16 So. (2d) 471 (1943).
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Lessees in Louisiana have seldom resorted to specific perform-
ance,132 probably because the state does not favor the use of this
equitable remedy.133 But where possible, this remedy will be ordered.
Injunctive relief has usually been allowed the lessee where his
legal remedies are inadequate.134 For example, it is relied upon to
enjoin trespass,' 35 especially when continuous.' 36
Land held by co-owners may be partitioned in this jurisdiction.137
And the co-owners must hold the property in common.138 Thus in
one case, Starr Davis Oil Co. v. Webber,'3 9 one having a fractional
interest in the minerals was not a co-owner holding the property in
common with the landowners and partition was denied. "There was
not a joint ownership of a single right but two absolute rights, inde-
pendent of each other." 140
Conclusion
If all of the states were as logical in following thesis to proper
conclusions as Texas has been, many of the difficulf reconciliations
now needed in this area of law would never have arisen. Texas courts,
whether right or wrong, announced their version of absolute ownership
in place, and they have carried this theory with them with little
hesitation to give the lessee all of the remedies he would have as owner
of Blackacre. Other states, notably West Virginia, have recognized a
type of absolute ownership in place, but have wavered when called
upon to describe the lessee's interest as an outright ownership of
minerals through sale.
Consistency has not been the friend of the ownership theory states
alone, since California and Illinois courts, in applying the non-owner-
ship theory, have been quite thorough in denying to lessees remedies
available to actual landowners. The discrepancies found in taxation
cases should probably not be held against them.
131 The court relied on Union Oil Co. v. Reconstruction Oil Co., 4 Cal. (2d)
541, 51 P. (2d) 81 (1935), and Texas Co. v. Hollingsworth, 304 Ill. App. 607,
27 N.E. (2d) 67 (1940).
132 As to the right of specific performance, see LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 1927
(West 1952).
133 Goudeau v. Daigle, 124 F. (2d) 656, 658 (5th Cir. 1942); Pratt v.
McCoy, 128 La. 570, 54 So. 1012, 1029 (1911).
134 1 Suimnms, op. cit. supra note 6, § 28.
135 Houston Ice & Brewing Ass'n v. Murray Oil Co., 145 La. 1050, 83 So.
239 (1919).
136 Gliptis v. Fifteen Oil Co., 204 La. 896, 16 So. (2d) 471 (1943).
137 LA. Crv. CODE ANN. art. 1289 (West 1952).
138 LA. CIV. CODE ANN. arts. 1307-1308 (West 1952).
139 218 La. 231, 48 So. (2d) 906 (1950).
140 Id., 48 So. (2d) at 908. See also Denegre, Ca-ownerslhp of Ol and Gas
Interests in Louisiana, 24 TVLANE L. REv. 288 (1950).
